ISLAMABAD: The Supreme Court has claimed it constantly sees hold-up in filing prison requests or applications for authorization to file appeals in criminal situations by imprisoned charged via the lens of basic rights, specifically when the right to liberty, dignity and reasonable trial guaranteed under Articles 9, 14 and 10A of the Constitution are included.
” In a criminal instance where the freedom as well as liberty of an individual goes to stake, ‘enough cause’ is to be viewed by the court through the lens of essential legal rights ensured under the Constitution, in particular through the right to freedom, dignity and also reasonable test guaranteed to an implicated under Articles 9, 14 as well as 10A of the Constitution,” observed Justice Syed Mansoor Ali Shah in a judgement he wrote.
A detainee encounters obstacles in seeking lawful solution, the judgement explains
Justice Shah belonged to a bench, likewise including Justice Umar Ata Bandial and Justice Qazi Mohammad Amin Ahmed, that had taken up an application by one Mohammad Arshad Nadeem seeking condonation of hold-up in a post-arrest issue against the Dec 14, 2020 Lahore High Court (LHC) order.
The reasoning noted that there was a hold-up of 72 days in filing the application for leave to appeal against the LHC order where post-arrest bail was decreased to the petitioner.
In the application for condonation of hold-up, the petitioner had said that he was behind the bars and there was no male member in his family members to seek his case that was why delay occurred in involving a legal representative for submitting the application, thus it was neither deliberate neither deliberate.
The judgement clarified that Rule 2 of Order XXIII of the Supreme Court Rules, 1980 offered that a petition for entrust to appeal, under Article 185( 3) of the Constitution, in a criminal matter should be lodged within thirty day from the date of reasoning or the final order against which the appeal was to be submitted.
The 2nd clause to the rule authorized the court to pardon the delay, if “sufficient cause” is shown, the order claimed, including as the expression “adequate reason” might not be specified with any type of accuracy or exactitude, the adequacy of the cause was, consequently, to be identified in each case on the basis of its own strange realities and conditions.
The judgement claimed the “adequate reason” largely converted right into offering the charged, that lagged bars, with equivalent accessibility to court and proper opportunity to protect as well as make use of remedies enabled by regulation, as were offered to a totally free person.
It had been a regular technique of the High court to lean in favour of choosing merits the applications, including jail applications, applications for leave to appeal and also charms submitted by or on behalf of the imprisoned individuals versus their convictions as well as sentences by excusing the delay with a tolerant and liberal approach, in the interest of justice, the judgement said.
The reason for taking such a permissive sight of “adequate reason” in such instances seemed based on the presumption that an individual behind bars had restricted accessibility to the outdoors and because of this he encountered impediments in seeking lawful treatments on trial, it kept in mind.
The delay, consequently, generally happened due to restrictions troubled him for remaining in jail and also not due to his contumacious conduct or some alternate objective, the reasoning said.
The reasons to pardon delay in declaring prison petitions or appeals versus convictions used with the exact same pressure to matters of post-arrest bond, as it likewise drew in the right to freedom, human dignity and reasonable trial, it claimed.
It would be fair to presume that an individual approaching a court of law for redressal of his complaint from behind bars endured a handicap in contrast to those who delighted in liberty and flexibility of movement, the reasoning claimed.
Therefore, it explained, incarceration of the petitioner looking for post-arrest bond by itself made up “sufficient cause” to permit condonation of delay unless it was established that the hold-up was triggered by the petitioner as a result of some ulterior motive.
In the long run, the court accepted the application as it located “adequate reason” for pardoning the delay, in the facts and scenarios of the present instance, by following the method of taking a lax and also permissive view in cases of imprisoned individuals, for the above factors. “We, consequently, permit the application and pardon the delay,” the reasoning stated.